The office of the Governor is expected to function as a neutral constitutional institution rather than as an agent of political interests. In the light of recent controversies, critically examine the constitutional role and challenges associated with the Governor's office.

Articles 153 to 167 envisage the Governor as a constitutional head bound by aid and advice, not a political agent.

Constitutional Mandate & Envisaged Role

• Art. 154 — executive power vested in Governor, exercised through Council of Ministers (Art. 163)
• Art. 163(1) — Governor to act on aid and advice of CM-led Council except in matters requiring discretion
• Art. 200/201 — assent to bills envisaged as a safeguard, not an absolute veto
• Art. 356 — recommendation for President's Rule meant as an emergency, last-resort provision
• Constituent Assembly Debates — Dr. B.R. Ambedkar held that the Governor has "no functions which he can discharge by himself"

Discretionary Powers: Contested Scope

• Art. 163(2) — discretion in matters like inviting a party to form government, dissolution of assembly, reservation of bills for President
• Reservation of bills under Art. 200 increasingly used to indefinitely stall state legislation
• Art. 174 — power to summon/prorogue Assembly turned contentious in Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka episodes
• Governor's role in floor tests during hung assemblies — Karnataka (2019), Maharashtra (2019)

Recent Controversies

• Maharashtra (2019) — pre-dawn oath ceremony without floor test invited SC intervention
• Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Punjab, Telangana — Bills kept pending Governor's assent for months, even years
• West Bengal — recurring friction over university Vice-Chancellor appointments (Governor as Chancellor)
• Delay in assent functioning as a de facto pocket veto, defeating the spirit of Art. 200

Judicial Interventions

• S.R. Bommai v. UOI (1994) — subjected Art. 356 proclamations to judicial review; floor test made the true test of majority
• Rameshwar Prasad v. UOI (2006) — SC struck down premature dissolution of Bihar Assembly as mala fide
• Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016) — Governor's discretion to summon Assembly is not unfettered; must ordinarily act on ministerial advice
• B.P. Singhal v. UOI (2010) — removal of Governor must not be arbitrary; requires "compelling reasons"
• State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to Governor (2023) — SC held Governor cannot indefinitely withhold assent; must act "as soon as possible" under Art. 200

Structural & Systemic Challenges

• No fixed tenure — serves "during the pleasure of the President" (Art. 156), enabling politically motivated removal
• No mandatory consultation with State Chief Minister prior to appointment
• Frequent appointment of former active politicians fuels perception of partisan bias
• Dual role as university Chancellor politicises higher education administration

Committee Recommendations & Way Forward

• Sarkaria Commission (1988) — consultation with CM before appointment; avoid appointing active politicians
• Punchhi Commission (2010) — fixed 5-year tenure; statutory time-limit for assent to bills
• NCRWC (2002) — appointment through a body involving Vice-President, Lok Sabha Speaker and CM
• Institutionalise the 2023 SC ruling's timelines into a binding statutory framework
• Conclusion: The Governor's office must operate strictly within constitutional propriety — as a "friend, philosopher and guide" — insulated from partisan capture, to preserve the cooperative-federal balance envisaged by the Constitution.

Click here to watch the video